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Preface

We aim to persuade you to adopt a liberal view of contract law. To achieve
this goal, this book offers choice theory, an approach that departs ti·om contemporary accounts in two ways: it analyzes the field as a whole and puts
freedom back into "freedom of contract."

***
Our first departure is to explore contract as a whole, not just the narrow
commercial issues that are of primary scholarly concern today. For millennia,
contract law has been organized around a diverse array of off-the-shelf solutions for many of life's pressing contractual challenges - that is, around
contract types for family, work, and home, along with commerce.
But then, in the late 18oos, classical legal thought in America began shifting
contract's terrain. The transition culminated in the 1920s with Samuel Williston's multivolume treatise, The Law of Contracts- a work that still shapes the
everyday law. Williston's goal was to unifY a body oflaw whose fragmentation,
in his view, obscured the field's basic principles. The result of his project was
to give pride of place to commercial contracts, and as a by-product, render
peripheral the diversity of other contract types.
Williston replaced the unprincipled multiplicity of the common law (and
European civil law) with the unprincipled uniformity that dominates American contract law today. This shift had an une:x:pected implication: if contracts
are for commerce, then the law should maximize utility, a goal understood
primarily in terms of material benefits. Competing values like autonomy and
community could be ignored because they came to be seen as outside
the field.
But what if the values contracting parties actually care about are in conflict?
It's here that the now-conventional scope of the field (the Willistonian project)
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and the now-dominant method of inquiry (efficiency analysis) fall short.
Utility matters, but it is not the sole, or even the dominant, value people seek
when contracting.
Despite Williston's success in reshaping the field , existing contract law still
offers types that vary widely in their normative struchues: some are indeed
organized to promote utility, others to enhance community, but most aim to
achieve a mix of these values. In large measure, what ensures contractual
autonomy is people's continuing ability to choose from among diverse types
within each important sphere of human interaction. Based on this descriptive
reality, and the normative imperatives it suggests, we renew the focus on
contract types and, in so doing, reject \Villiston's answer to the question,
"\Vhat is contract?"

Our second departure is to offer a rigorous normative account of contract
types. Freedom comes first. Ours is a liberal account that takes seriously
contract's role in enhancing autonomy.
We are not the first on this path. Charles Fried, in his 1981 volume Contract
as Promise, recovered autonomy as the moral core of contract. Departing from
Williston's unprincipled unifonnity, Fried aimed at principled tmi{om1ity.
Fried argued correctly that autonomy matters centrally to contract - in this,
he made an enduring contribution . But his specific arguments faltered
because he missed the role of diverse contract types and because he grounded
contractual freedom in a flawed, rights-based view. Despite decades of effort
by Fried and by later liberal theorists, we can now say all rights-based arguments for contractual autonomy have failed .
This failure has high costs: if freedom drops away as a justification for
contract, then what's left, mostly, is the efficiency approach. But a thoroughgoing efficiency theory of contract has never been persuasive. Other values
cannot be banished altogether if, for example, you oppose slavery and endorse
marriage. The challenge is to offer a normatively appealing way to situate
efficiency analysis within a liberal framework. The first step in that project is to
reject Fried's answer to the question, "What is freedom?"

* ~c *
We offer this book as a counterpoint to Williston and Fried. Choice themy
shows how contract law can enhance individual autonomy while, at the same
time, providing the economic and social benefits people seek in working
together. Our approach returns analysis to the mainstream of twentieth-
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century liberalism - a tradition concerned with enhancing self-determination
that is mostly absent in contract the01y today. By showing how this tradition
applies to contract law as a whole, choice theory moves from the principled
unifonnity that Fried attempted to the principled multiplicity that liberalism
requires.
While not (yet) a restatement of contract law, choice theory offers numerous appealing doctrinal refinements and solves many long-standing puzzles in
contract law and theory. It provides efficiency analysts of contract a more
secure normative grounding for their work. And it offers teachers and students
of contract law, for the first time, a coherent nonnative vocabulaty that makes
sense of the casebook canon. Choice theory shows why and how freedom
matters to contract.

Introduction

CHOICE THEORY

As free people, we do not live each on our own island, isolated in perfect
independence . We want and need each other to achieve life's worthy goals.
Contract law provides a powerful means to achieve these goals. Through
contract, we can recruit others to help write the stories of our lives .
There's a catch, however. Contracts require enforcement; enforcement
entails coercion; and coercion seems at odds with freedom. So, is "freedom
of contract" possible? Yes, the state can respect, indeed enhance, our autonomy even when it enforces our contracts . However, the truth of this proposition is not self-evident. The aim of this book is to show how a robust
commitment to freedom justifies and shapes contract law in a liberal polity.
We start from the mainstream liberal tradition of the past century, that is,
with concern for individual autonomy - with self-detem1ination, with selfauthorship, with ensuring to us, as individuals, the ability to write and re-write
the story of our own lives. This deep and widely-shared sense of what it means
to be free - the liberalism of Isaiah Berlin, H.L.A. Hart, and John Rawls rightly dominates the most impmtant political, legal, and philosophical debates.
Surprisingly, however, this approach has gone missing in recent generations
of work on private law in general and contract law specifically. Other notions
of contractual autonomy - say Kantian and libe1tarian ideas of personal
independence- now have a powe1ful hold on the field. But they all necessarily fail for reasons we detail in Chapters 1 tluough 3· Similarly, foundational
alternatives for liberalism itself, such as political liberalism, are not adequate
to justify contract law, as we explain in Chapter 8, where we answer many
objections to our theory.
We call our approach tl1e choice themy of contract. In this view, the state
enforces contracts not just to make society as a whole better off- that's the
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efficiency rationale- but even more fundamentally to enhance people's autonomy so that they can make their lives meaningfully their own. Much of our task
is to persuade you that any contract theory worthy of being called liberal must
concern itself with autonomy defined in this sense, as self-determination.
Choice themy answers the most important questions of contract theory:
What is the "freedom" celebrated in "freedom of contract"? How are individuals freer when the state coerces contract performance? What core values
should contract law advance and how do those values inter-relate? Must the
state take an active role in shaping conh·act law? If so, what is that role?
Existing approaches have failed to answer these fundamental questions.
One observer goes so far as to say that "today there is no generally recognized
theory of contract. The effort to develop a coherent explanation of contract
seems to have reached an impasse. 711 There is no impasse. A doctrinally wellfit, conceptually coherent, and normatively attractive account of contract is in
view. Choice theory starts with the most appealing, least controversial tenets of
modem liberalism and ends with their implications for contract law.

FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS

The main tool that choice theory uses to point the way forward is an organizing
framework we call "freedom of contracts." We would like to claim the ubiquitous phrase "freedom of contract" - without the "s" - but we leave the term
aside because of its confounding negative liberty and laissez faire associations.
"Freedom of contracts" sums up the three irreducible elements necessary to
contractual autonomy: (1) an overarching voluntariness principle, sometimes
called freedom from contract; (2) the familiar freedom to bargain foi- terms
within a contract; and (3) the long-neglected freedom to choose from among
contract types. As we will show, attention to the third element- choice among
types - is the key that can set conh·act theory on a sustainably liberal path.
We agree that the first element, voluntariness, is an essential aspect of free
contracting, with a twist we'll get to in Chapter 8. Also, we acknowledge that
the second component, bargaining for terms within a contract, is a nontrivial
aspect of contracting. It's the overwhelming focus of current the01y. At times,
people really do want their own idiosyncratic deal and they need the law to do
no more than enforce their joint agreement.
But bargaining for tenns is not the dominant mode of contracting, and it
should not determine, as it long has, the central meaning of contractual
autonomy. Usually, when people voluntarily enter contracts, they are not
designing their deal from scratch. For most of us, most of the time - if we
get married, start a new job, or click "I accept" - contractual freedom means
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the ability to choose from among a sufficient range of off-the-shelf, normatively attractive contract types and then, perhaps, make a few contextual
adjustments within the deal. In large measure, freedom means pursuing the
valuable ends of our lives, not spending our resources dickering over contract
terms and wonying whether others are taking advantage of us.
In other words, the mainstay of present-day contracting is the choice among
types. By "types," we do not mean standard-form contracts or boilerplate terms
as such. Forms or terms may reflect the parties' choice of a particular type (say,
a franchise agreement); they may push a type in a certain direction (say, a
landlord-provided lease), or they may point toward emergence of a new type
(such as a cohabitation agreement). But standard forms and terms are not
themselves types. They are particular instances of the types of relationships
people contractually create, whether franchise or agency, commercial or
residential lease, cohabitation or marriage.
Each type uses distinctive doctrinal features embedded in the law - not just
in form contracts or boilerplate terms - to embody that type's particular
normative concerns and stabilize its shared cultural meaning. To give just a
few examples, consider doctrines such as waiting periods to dissolve marriage
contracts, limitations on enforcement of employee noncompete agreements,
and generous return rules in consumer transactions. From the perspective of
most contract themy today - focused on freedom to bargain for terms inside a
contract - such doctrinal rules may seem to be exceptions from a general
norm, oddities needing rationalization, or even worse, they may be framed
simply as limits on contractual freedom to be discarded.
By contrast, choice theory suggests that each of these doctrines, and many
others, may be better understood as clues to and reflections of the divergent
normative concerns of a particular contract type. By stabilizing their respective
types, by making them more available and attractive to contracting pa1ties, and
by making available distinct choices about the structure of important relationships, such doctrinal rules can enhance contractual freedom.
Attention to the actually existing choice among types opens the door to a
liberal and general theory of contract law. Let's introduce those three components in turn.

A LIBERAL THEORY

To qualify as liberal, contract theory must be grounded in an appealing
conception of contractual "autonomy" - or "freedom" or "liberty" (we use
these terms interchangeably for reasons that will become apparent by the end
of Chapter 4). The problem is that contractual autonomy is not self-defining.
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Just the opposite. Pinning it down is tough, much tougher than the concept's
2
easy intuitive appeal suggests.

Autonomy through Choice . The first theoretical aspiration of choice theory is
to offer a liberal conception of contractual autonomy grounded in, and welladapted to, the actual diversity of contract types. One element of this autonomy- reflecting the usual meaning of freedom of contract- involves supporting individuals as they pursue their own idiosyncratic deals. But contract law
must do more if it is to expand meaningful choices in service of autonomy. It
must also support freedom to choose from among diverse, normatively attractive
contract types in each important area of human interaction. Free people are
defined in part by the attractive choices they reject, not just those they select.
The implications of this claim are stark. It is here that choice theory offers
its single most important and distinctive normative payoff: a state committed to
human freedom must be proactive in shaping contract law, including ensuring availability of a diverse body of normatively attractive types. This commitment means that the state is sometimes obligated to support establishment of
emerging types that setve minoritarian or utopian values - even when market
demand for the new types is low. This suppmt can take the form of enforcing
novel contract types (say, judicially created cohabitation doctrines or privately
drafted commercial surrogacy contracts) or removing legislative and regulatory
hurdles to emerging contract types (such as Canada's "dependent contractors"). We illustrate this process in Chapter 11, and then, in Chapter 12, we
explore some countervailing limits to expanding choice - based on cognitive,
behavioral, structural, and political economy grounds and in response to
concerns about comparative institutional competence.

1.

2. Mandatory Rules and Autonomy. As a corollary to supporting new types,
sometimes the state must also restrict choice within types. By stabilizing and
channeling cultural expectations regarding types, such restrictions may be
necessary to make them effective. This last point suggests a surprising payoff
of choice theory: sticky defaults and even mandatory terms within a contract
type can actually increase freedom, so long as - and this is crucial - law offers
sufficient choice among types, a claim we justify and refine in Chapter 10.

A GENERAL THEORY

The second conceptual component of choice theory is to show how a liberal
contract theory can also be a general one . To qualify as general, a theory must
address the varied goods and diverse spheres of contracting.

Introduction
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1. Intra-Sphere Multiplicity. Accordingly, we reject the notion that any single
value - utility, community, or even autonomy - suffices for a coherent
general theory. Instead, we relocate most of the normative (and doctrinal)
discussion to a more correct and productive level - relating to the diverse
values that animate each type and the recurring dilemmas common to
each sphere. For now, it suffices to note that by "sphere," we mean a core
realm of human interaction in which contract law can enrich how individuals
legitimately enlist others to their projects. The particular taxonomy of spheres
we develop in Chapter 9 is wholly instmmental to this end of ensuring
adequate choice among types. (Chapter 10 pins down "types," including
how we know when a new "type" has emerged and when the range of types
. "a dequate. ")
IS
It should be no surprise that the values plausibly animating marriage,
employment, and consumer transactions differ from each other and from
those driving commercial transactions, and further that, the contract types
within a single sphere offer individuals choices among divergent values.
Indeed, the core requirement of choice theory is the availability of normatively attractive types with distinct value mixes that can serve as effective
substitutes within each sphere -what we call intra-sphere multiplicity.

2.

Freedom for Economists. One collateral benefit of this approach - and a

major impetus for this book - is to offer efficiency-oriented contract scholars
a more secure and defensible normative grounding for their work. Much of
contract law is, and should be, driven by efficiency concerns. But a thoroughgoing efficiency theory of contract has never been persuasive. Autonomy and
community concerns cannot be banished altogether if, for example, you
oppose slavery and endorse marriage. So, how do these normative commitments interrelate?
Choice theory solves this puzzle. It shows how contract law can enhance
individual autonomy while at the same time providing people with the
economic and social benefits they seek. Thus, we recognize autonomy as
contract law's ultimate value, as set out in Chapters 4 and 7· At the same time,
we note that people usually do not enter into specific contracts to become
freer. Sometimes, people contract to achieve "utility," as framed in Chapter 5·
Other times, they seek "community" - the somewhat clunky term we define
in Chapter 6 to encompass the social benefits of contracting, as distinct from
utilitarian ones. Contrach1al autonomy operates primarily, but not entirely, to
ensure that people can make effective choices among these values when they
so choose.

6
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For efficiency theorists, we offer a path back from the uncomfortable
collectivist position implied by an exclusive focus on maximizing social
welfare, and we give them a normatively appealing way to situate efficiency analysis within a liberal framework. Most efficiency theori~ts care
about freedom , but they haven't had a compelling way to incorporate that
concern into their models besides some hand-waving in its general
direction.
We show the way: efficiency theorists must, at the least, adopt as friendly
amendments five theoretical points in Chapter 8 and consider a somewhat
larger number of novel doctrinal refmms sprinkled throughout the book and
collected in the Conclusion. In short, freedom has a price.

A THEORY OF LAW

Finally, to qualify as a liberal and general themy of law, we consider seriously
the distinctive reform program of choice theory. It boils down to two components: first, a liberal state is obligated to ensure intra-sphere multiplicity; second,
the meaning of trans-substantive or "general" contract law concepts should
vary according to the "local" animating principles of particular contract types.
We consider these in turn:

The State's Affinnative Role. Prior autonomy-based theories have conflated
ideal contract law with legal passivity, that is, with the commitment that law
aim just to enforce the parties' wills and maybe cure discrete market failures .
By contrast, choice themy shows why a state committed to human freedom
must actively enable people's relationships by shaping distinct contract types.
Contract law has a crucial role to play in delivering on the liberal promise of
freedom. The state may betray this autonomy-enhancing mission not only by
having bad law or too much law; law's absence may undermine it just as welP
Put more sharply, choice theory shows that liberal states are affirmatively
obligated to ensure an adequate range of contract types in each important
sphere of human interaction - subject to concerns about comparative institutional competence discussed in Chapter 12.
Choice theory is at its strongest in analyzing new and emerging contract
types- in areas as diverse as gestational surrogacy, employment in the sharing
economy, and the partnership structure of law firms . While the market for
contractual innovation is vibrant, particularly in the commercial sphere, there
is no reason to believe that existing types either exhaust the variety of goods
that people seek by contracting or are best configured to support their divergent goals.
1.
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"Local" Contract Law. A second implication of choice theory is to challenge the idea that "general" contract law principles should have a universal
meaning across contract law.4 The seeming incoherence of this view, which
advocates multiplicity in the name of one underlying commitment to autonomy, dissolves once we appreciate its reliance on a familiar, autonomy-based
commitment to pluralism. Our method has the virtue of providing a textured
way to evaluate the fine doctrinal details of contract law, as we discuss in the
back half of the book.
We show that the application of familiar contract concepts- including, for
example, liquidated damages, efficient breach, and the duty of good faith and
fair dealing - should vary depending on the normative concerns driving
different contract types. Even voluntariness, the most trans-substantive contract concern, should be understood differently in different types, and the
doctrinal tools used to protect this concern should vary accordingly. Further,
we show how universal application of "general" contract law doctrines has led
to doctrinal confusion in long-standing contract types. We give examples of
how choice theory can improve our understanding of, for example, the law
of agency, bailments, consumer transactions, fiduciaries , and suretyship- the
ABCs of traditional, pre-Willistonian contract law.
A consistent commitment to autonomy as the normative foundation of
contract implies that doctrinal interpretation and evaluation should, by and
large, look to the "local" animating principles of existing contract types rather
than to any "core" principle of contract law. While this stance may seem novel
to some American contract theorists, it can be understood as a principled
analogue to the ordinary, taxonomic civil law approach in which "the classification of the contract as a particular type[,] generates a set of abstract expectations as to what is central to that contract." 5
2.

CONTRACTS AS A WHOLE

It should be apparent already that choice themy makes two substantial departures from contemporary approaches to contract. As noted in the Preface, we
are interested in the field as a whole and we take seriously the centrality of
freedom to contract. A few more words on these departures may be helpful.

The Willistonian Constraint. In our view, contract theory seems to have
reached "an impasse" primarily because the field of study has been so
artificially constrained. If you ask theorists about marriage or surrogacy
contract types, many answer: that's family law, not contracts. How about
new forms of worker contracts? That's employment or labor law. Consumer
1.
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transactions? They're part of the regulatory state. Rather than embracing
diverse types, contract theory has shrunk its focus to certain commercial
transactions.
This conceptual shrinkage represents an ahistorical and misleading view of
contract. 6 From Roman times nearly to the present, contract law was built on
an appreciation of the role of existing and emerging contract types. Ancient
Roman law .jtself was marked by a divide between "nominate" contracts
(contract types) and "innominate" contracts (freestanding bargains), a distinction that persists in European civil law systems ? For example, German law
today offers a taxonomy of "typical" contract types, each with its own tailored
doctrines; it has methods for shunting analysis of "hybrid" or "mixed" contracts through the existing types; and it deploys recognition mechanisms for
"atypical," "customary," and "new" types. 8 By contrast, contract theory in
America has lost sight of this deep structure.
The story of how contract was transformed in America is beyond our scope
here. It is enough to mention that this process shifted contract theory from
concern with distinctive types to a trans-substantive, stylized, and seemingly
universal approach. The transition began with the work of Christopher
Columbus Langdell in the late 18oos, was crystalized in Samuel Williston's
1920 treatise The Law of Contracts, and was fully cemented in the 1932 First
Restatement of Contracts (with Williston as Reporter).9 Perhaps because of
his abiding concern with creating a national, uniform legal architecture for
commerce, Williston made many actual contracting practices seem peripheral - or outside of contract law altogether. This distinctive, early twentieth- ,
century American trajectory elevated commercial transactions to the core of
contract, and, as a byproduct, substantially obscured the generative role of
diverse contract types.
Wil1iston's aspiration to transcend contract types with "general " law is
understandable and indeed laudable (especially if reframed as the "residual
categmy of freestanding contracting" that we suggest in Chapter 8). But
lawyers cannot rely on "general" contract law to engage with the key elements
of employment, family, or other ordinary types of contract - even if the law
were redesigned as we recommend. To rely on any general view would often
constitute malpractice.10 And yet, contract theory today is dominated by the
notion of general contract law and is structured around the specific, not very
representative, sphere of commercial contracting.
So, in brief, the first substantial departure for choice theory is to push back
against the Willistonian notion that the core of contracting is dickering over
terms within a commercial deal. Such transactions are surely important, but
they are not the platonic type of any contracting sphere, not even- as it turns
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out - in a world of commerce, a world that has been increasingly affected by
collaborative contracting, shategic alliances, and business networks, among
many other innovative practices. While we are not the first to note the
overlooked role of contract types - relational theorists following Karl Llewellyn's lead have also resisted the Willistonian move"- we are the first to offer a
normative account that connects the multiplicity of types with its role in
enhancing freedom .
2. Teaching Contract Law. Unfortunately, contract law teaching has
followed Williston's commercial law push . The leading casebooks through
which American law students learn contracts are all organized along transsubstantive lines and marginalize many noncommercial contracting practices from their explanatmy field.' 2 Each presents Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-

Gordon, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, Jacob 6 Youngs v. Kent,
Hadley v. Baxendale, Taylor v. Caldwell, and the same few dozen prima1y
teaching cases (with minor variations) to drive home a Willistonian agenda
supported by a thin utilitarian scaffolding. By our count, the strong majority
of the roughly 1200 excerpted cases in the top six casebooks have a
commercial focus .'3 No book contains even a single chapter devoted to
noncommercial contract types and none offers a coherent framework for
analyzing what is distinctive about contracting in the spheres of work,
home, or intimacy.' 4
Wisps of conceptual and normative concern appear sporadically when the
books note "deviations" from a trans-substantive application of concepts such
as promissmy estoppel, unconscionability, consideration, specific performance, or misrepresentation.' 5 These deviations appear mostly as instances of
judicial application of ''public policy" or equitable powers in noncommercial
contexts- in contrast to the vast majority of excerpted cases decided "at law"
and used to illustrate rule-based, commercially oriented, trans-substantive
principles.
It's a mistake, though, to say that cases decided on public policy or equity
grounds are outliers from a coherent core. Public policy and equity tap into
tlueads of contract law as deep as tl1ose decided at law. The challenge for
students is that the casebooks do not offer them (or their professors) any
coherent vocabulary for talking through what principles might animate public
policy or equity. Are these concepts tlueaded coherently through contract law
or are they just an ad hoc grab bag? When should we apply which principle?
In addition, the "general" law taught to 1Ls gives them no purchase on the
diverse family, work, home, and consumer contract types they encounter in
upper-level "contracts" classes and later in legal practice. Students begin their

10
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careers without a language for thinking through why contract law appears as it
does and without tools for arguing how it should be shaped going fmward other than some undeveloped utilitarian commitments.
It may be worth noting that contract is a private law outlier. Other private
law fields have not gone through quite the same flattening process. For
example, property still focuses on recurring dilemmas of distinctive property
types - that is, conveyancing, leasing, servitudes, co-ownership, and intellectual propelty - and the palticular normative concerns underlying each of
these property institutions. Totts, too, still retains some of the lumpy quality of
pre-Williston contracts (notwithstanding the exaggerated teaching focus today
on negligence).
The first-year contract law curriculum represents Williston's greatest victory. To the extent this book has a pedagogical purpose, it is to shift the
conceptual framework and normative language that students - and later
la\!1-yers, judges, and scholars - bring to analyzing contract in America. To
start, we reject Williston's answer to the question, "what is contract?"

THE NATURE OF CONTRACTUAL FREEDOM

Our second departure concerns the nature of contractual freedom. This is not
a new problem. Some liberal contract theorists - notably Charles Fried in
Contract as Promise - take Kant as their starting point. Others start with a
libettarian philosopher like Robett Nozick. Depending on which aspect of
freedom they celebrate, liberal theorists have given the resulting approaches
names such as "promise theory," "transfer theory," and "consent theory." All
these modern theories share a crucial element: they answer the question
"what is freedom?" with a rights-based (or deontological) view of contract that
excludes consequentialist (or teleological) elements.
While these theories make many useful contributions, as a group, they
have reached a dead end. This is not to condemn deontological theories of
private law in general. It may be possible, for example, to construct a persuasive deontological approach to tort law. Our claim is more targeted: despite
several decades of sustained effort, rights-based theories of contractual autonomy, and the ambitious reform programs they advance, have failed. It is time
to move on.
The crucial wrong turn of existing liberal contract theories is to associate
the phrase "freedom of contract" with negative liberty or personal independence, that is, with the idea that contract law should enforce whatever private
deals individuals agree to and othetwise get out of the way. In large measure,
this view is the philosophical counterpoint to the Willistonian project - and
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indeed Williston himself advocated such a stance.16 If contract centrally
concerns sophisticated business dealings, then a negative liberty view is
neither surprising nor entirely unjustifiable.
But this narrow justification has spread beyond the commercial context. It
has become a commitment "fundamental in the orthodox understanding of
contract law, that the content of a contractual obligation is a matter for the
parties, not the law.m7 The strongest version of this claim comes from the legal
economist Richard Craswell, who writes that contractual freedom "has very
little to do" with contract law and is thus perceived as "largely irrelevant" to its
design. 18 In this view, "freedom of contract" more or less devolves into an
essentially hands-off stance for the state, a view that misses much of how
contract law can, should, and actually does secure freedom. 19
Existing liberal contract theories may fit well with limited aspects of commercial contracting, but they fail when expanded to cover contract law as a
whole. People want, and the law has always offered, much more than just
a negative liberty version of contract. Descriptively, then, existing liberal
theories miss the texture of why we contract with one another; conceptually,
they overlook key features of contractual autonomy; normatively, they slight
the diverse goods of contracting.
The conventional liberal view is bad theory. Bad theory is costly, and not
just in theory. Together with the Willistonian project, the negative liberty view
has helped splinter contract into disparate and noncommunicating fields. For
example, many scholars of work and family define their fields as distinct from,
and even in opposition to, contract law. In so doing, they are often trying to
shield their contract types from what they see as the troublesome implications
of the negative liberty view. 2 0 But they, and we, pay a high price. We all miss
the reform payoffs that come from appreciating the autonomy-enhancing
potential of contract in employment, labor, and family law and from leveraging insights arising across the whole of contracting practice.
Another cost of the negativ:e liberty view is subtler. After employment law,
labor law, family law, and other core fields flee, what's left in contract law
today is mostly the law of commercial transactions. Current liberal theories
do not have much that is persuasive to say about business law. Even Fried, in
his recent work, finds that his liberal theory substantially dissolves into
familiar efficiency reforms. 21 To the extent individuals want their sophisticated business contracts to be primarily wealth-maximizing, efficiency analysis should, for the most part, dominate discussion and liberal contract reforms
should have little traction.
Conversely, efficiency theorists understand that efficiency cannot be their
only metric, even for business law. But adopting any of the current liberal
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theories - with their muddled conceptual apparatuses and unpersuasive
normative programs - would exact too high a price. So, efficiency theorists
may say freedom "jumpstarts" contract or plays some other minimal role, but
liberal values mostly reside outside their models. The turn by efficiency
analysis of contract away from liberal principles is costly and premature, both
for their own work and for the law's development.
While existing liberal theories of contractual freedom all fail , that does not
mean we have to give up on freedom. The mainstream liberal view of autonomy (as self-determination) remains available, and properly understood, it
provides a secure justification for contract law. Choice themy plays nicely with
efficiency analysis - it puts freedom back into the equation.

THREE METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

Before we hit the road, three methodological comments are in order regarding
the nature of our themy and its precise subject matter and limits. The first
concerns interpretation, the second focuses on the difference between categories for deciding and thinking, and the final addresses the path from theory
to practice .
1.

On Interpretation. We view our approach as an interpretation of existing

contract law in liberal societies, one that crafts a theoretical framework for its
doctrines that presents them in their best light. An "interpretive theory" of law,
like ours, is aimed not at discovering the original intentions of lawmakers, nor
at analyzing law's historical evolution. It is not intended to uproot existing
practices, nor to supplant law with wholly innovative ways of organizing society.
Rather, an interpretative theory is situated between discovery and invention.22 It builds on existing practices and thus reaffirms much of existing law.
But it provides an account of these practices that suggests a new perspective on
the law, which inevitably upsets some conventional wisdom. It thus points
to possible improvements to the law as well as to new questions that offer a
research agenda for future reformers and scholars.
Indeed, as Rawls noted, interpretive theories aim at both understanding an
existing practice and directing its evolution. Accordingly, they need to distinguish between "core" features of the practice, which serve as fixed points to
which a theory must fit, and other features that can be treated with less
deference and are thus reexamined and potentially reformed in light of the
theory.23
Existing theories of contract law indeed make such distinctions (explicitly
or implicitly), treating, for example, the expectation measure of recovery or
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the consideration requirement as contract's doctrinal core. 24 However, these
choices are by no means obvious: consideration, for example, is not even a
necessary, let alone core, characteristic of contract in most Continental jurisdictions.25 Furthermore, looking for a rule that runs through the various
contract types already presupposes the flattening Willistonian view of contract
as a shapeless unified form .
Therefore, our choice of core is different in kind: choice theory focuses
exactly on what the now-conventional view obscures - the multiplicity of
contract types that typifies actual contract law. We present this multiplicity in
its best light by highlighting its autonomy-enhancing function. As with any
other interpretive theory, we cannot expect our interpretation to explain every
extant feature of the law. But the gaps that choice theory reveals are useful:
they help focus attention on whether and why the law doesn't live up to its
own (implicit) ideals.26
What first appears as a blemish on the law turns out to be the most
important takeaway of choice the01y - the relative paucity of types in the
realms of family, work, and home compared with the sphere of commerce,
and the state's obligations in response.
2 . On Deciding and Thinking . Putting multiplicity front and center raises a
second methodological conundrum. If the differences among contract types
are as significant as we claim, does that then imply that "contract" is not an
important overarching categ01y, which in tum means that there cannot be a
general theory of contract law?
No. A general theory is possible if we keep in mind the distinction between
categories for deciding and categories for thinking. 27 Choice the01y does imply
that the normative concerns underlying conb:act types are so diverse that
simply labeling something as "contract" is not enough to justify any concrete
reform consequence. In other words, we cannot justify treating contract as
category for deciding.
Nevertheless, this does not eliminate the significance of contract as a
doctrinal category. Quite the contrary. While normative concerns differ
among types, there are enough structural similarities that "contract" is still a
useful categ01y for thinking. For example, because all contract types must be
voluntary - given our fundamental commitment to autonomy as contract's
(one) ultimate value - securing voluntariness is a common challenge of
otherwise heterogeneous types. Thinking about the proper means for facing
this challenge across contract types may be helpful even if we conclude, as we
do in Chapter 8, that it is best handled by prescribing distinct doctrinal tools
tailored to the normative valences of particular contract types.
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Further, the underlying values animating diverse contract types do overlap:
they all aim at securing the instrumental and intrinsic goods of contract primarily utility and community - while securing autonomy, always as the
ultimate value and sometimes as a side-constraint (distinctions we set out in
Chapters 4 and 7). This overlap ensures that reflecting on the variety of
contract types is likely to yield some useful cross-fertilization and that, in turn,
justifies studying them together and treating them as the subject matter of
unified scholarly analysis.
Finally, appreciating the common function of all contract types in the
service of people's autonomy is crucial because it implies that, for evety sphere
of potential contracting activity, the state should provide a robust menu of
choices. It also implies that a liberal state must develop a category of "residual
contracting" for people who prefer to reject contract law's favored forms of
interaction (a category that may look quite different from the "general"
contract law of existing theory). 28 Freedom to choose among types can and
does sit comfmtably alongside the freedom to dicker over terms.
3· On Theory and Practice. As our title indicates and the text will confirm, this
is primarily a book in contract law theory. The front half criticizes existing
approaches; the back half offers an alternative. Our goal, though, is not just
better theory but also better practice.
We advance an innovative conception of contracts because we believe that
adopting choice theory and implementing its reform agenda will enhance the
self-determination of real people in the real world. Demonstrating a viable
path from theory to practice is, therefore, crucial. Otherwise, choice theory is
just a happy fantasy. Indeed, we suspect that some readers may become
impatient with questions of implementation even in reading this Introduction.
As we see it, these concerns come in two main forms: substantive and
institutional. Substantively, critics may worry that our call for multiplicity of
contract types will overlook the limits and drawbacks of choice. What if more
choice reduces freedom? Institutionally, critics may be concerned that our
references to "contract law'' doing this or that means \Ve believe that the
disembodied "law" is somehow the agent that should offer contract types or
facilitate choice within spheres. Are there actual legal institutions sufficiently
competent to implement choice theory?
These are legitimate challenges for anyone concerned with putting choice
theory into practice. We postpone our reply to Chapter 12, not because the
challenges are unimportant, but because a reply requires that we fiJ,"st set out
the contours of choice theory. On the substantive side, we identify a range
of cognitive, behavioral, structural, and political economy concerns about
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expanding choice. We offer this list as a research agenda for interdisciplinary
scholars interested in implementing choice theory.
Regarding the institutional challenge, we can sketch out some more practical steps. For example, in the sphere of commerce, we often see market
demand driving the creation of new business contract types. Sophisticated
commercial parties are likely to be the best type-developers in this sphere.
They share a wealth-maximizing metric for evaluating terms and they are
motivated to do a good design job because they can directly capture much of
the surplus they generate.
Challenges arise when the pa1ties' overriding goal moves away from wealth
maximization. Then, there is less reason to expect market demand to drive
creation of sufficient types. Implementing choice theory thus devolves into a
study of comparative institutional competence of actors including state legislatures and judges, the American Law Institute (ALI) and the Uniform Law
Commission (NCCUSL), along with public interest groups, law firms, and
lobbyists.
One approach is to encourage states to adopt successful types from other
states or countries (we give examples of this "comparative" strategy). Another is
to encourage them to support rather than squash emerging and utopian types
for which there is already some level of demand (the "experimental" strategy).
Institutions such as the ALI or NCCUSL may be able to refine innovative
types, say for cohabitation, civil unions, "dependent contractors," and so on
(the "incremental" strategy). We aren't arguing that any of these institutions
should initiate new contract types from scratch. How would they pick? Our
thoughts in this section are admittedly preliminary because full answers will
inevitably be linked to a particular contract type or a specific state or national
institutional design.
Thus, our argument in Chapter 12 about putting choice theory into practice
is somewhat modest, but nonetheless crucial. Most important, we rule out
the (devastating) possibility that substantive and institutional criticisms are
all-encompassing, and show instead that they are local to particular contract
types or institutional settings. There is room to implement choice themy such
that contract law does a better job than the status quo in enhancing people's
self-determination.

A BRIEF ROADMAP

Part I examines the contributions and limits of prior autonomy-based contract
theories. We show why Fried's approach to contractual autonomy cannot
work and why all the later rights-based versions from promise theory to transfer
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theory fare no better. Nevertheless, we argue that autonomy, understood as
self-determination, is still the ultimate value of contract. Much of the work
here is heavy-duty jurisprudence - we aim for brevity while trying to provide
enough detail to persuade the specialists.
Part II explores the main goods people seek from contracting. People
generally do not enter contracts to become freer, although autonomy does
function as an important side-constraint. The main goods of contract are
utility and community, as we define the terms. We show why neither good
works alone as the ultimate contract value, but both are essential to any
complete theory of the field.
Part III sets out choice theory and shows how contract law plays a positive,
active, and previously underappreciated autonomy-enhancing role. We start
by developing a more tailored view of autonomy for contract and show how
that value relates to utility and community. Values in conflict are the toughest
challenges, and we show how to resolve them. Then we spell out how those
values relate to contract spheres and types - refining choice theory along the
way, answering potential objections that it generates, and showing how it
resolves many doctrinal puzzles.
Our Conclusion sketches some of the challenges choice theory must face
and the research agenda that it generates as we move beyond Williston and
Fried . Choice theory shows that contract law matters even more to freedom
than has previously been understood.

***
Choice theory has several virtues. It offers a normatively attractive view of
freedom through contract law. It provides the first conceptually coherent
account of core contract values and their interrelationships. And finally,
choice theory marks a path for reform that brings contract law closer to widely
shared liberal ideals .
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